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Pillar 05 of 05

Commodities & Alternatives

Physical raw materials plus everything off the public exchange — crypto, private equity, real estate, venture capital.

2 deep dives published

Every Commodities & Alternatives entry.

Newest first. More gets added here every time this pillar comes back up in an issue.

From Issue No. 11 · Commodities & Alternatives

When One Friend Argues With Customer Service for the Whole Group

Fixed IncomeEquitiesForeign ExchangeDerivativesCommodities & Alternatives

This week's story lives in the alternatives world, in the hedge fund corner of it. In Issue 8 we followed private equity through its full lifecycle, raise the money, borrow to amplify it, improve the company, exit at a profit. This week we cross to the other side of the table and ask what happens to the shareholders on the receiving end of a take-private and meet the funds that have made that aftermath their entire business. The strategy has two levels, and we will build up to the clever part.

Step 1: Classic Merger Arbitrage

When a company agrees to be bought, its share price moves toward the deal price but rarely all the way. Take a Skechers-style example: the deal says $63, but the stock trades at, say, $61.50. Why the gap? Because deals can still fail, on regulators, financing, or cold feet. Merger arbitrage is the strategy of buying at $61.50 and waiting to collect $63 when the deal closes. That is $1.50 per share, roughly 2.4%, that looks close to certain, right up until it isn't. The risk is that the deal collapses and the stock falls back to where it was. Small, steady edges, repeated across many deals. This is the mild version of the strategy, and it has existed for decades.

Step 2: The Appraisal Twist

Appraisal arbitrage takes the same idea and pushes it further. Here, the fund buys after the announcement, say at $62, but not to collect the $63. It buys specifically to refuse the $63. Using appraisal rights, a shareholder's legal right to refuse a deal price and ask a judge to independently decide what the shares were worth, the fund asks the judge to set fair value, and suddenly the deal price stops being the ceiling of the return and becomes just one number in an argument.

For example, if the judge decides fair value was $70, the fund makes $8 on a $62 outlay, roughly a 13% gain, on the very shares everyone else gave up at $63. Delaware also adds interest to the award by default, at a set statutory rate, for the years the case takes, which makes the win bigger still. But the same logic works in reverse. If the judge decides $63 was fair, or worse, decides fair value was lower, the fund has tied up its money for years, paid real legal costs, and can walk away with less than the shareholders who simply took the deal and moved on. Delaware's interest helps, but because the company can prepay and stop the clock, it cannot be counted on to rescue a bad ruling. This is not free money. It is a researched bet on a legal outcome, sized and risked like any other position.

If the Judge Agrees With the Funds

Bought after announcement at: $62 · Deal price everyone else took: $63 · Judge's fair value ruling: $70

+$8 per share — Roughly a 13% gain, plus possible interest for the wait.

If the Judge Sides With the Deal

Bought after announcement at: $62 · Deal price everyone else took: $63 · Judge's fair value ruling: $61

−$1 per share — Plus years of legal costs and tied-up money, while everyone who took $63 moved on.

Step 3: The Document Play, and Why the Class Action Is the Bigger Prize

The appraisal case answers the question of what the shares were worth, and its award goes only to the shareholders who filed. The class action asks a broader and more serious question: did the insiders breach their fiduciary duty? If the funds win, the payout goes to every shareholder who was cashed out in the deal, not just the ones who filed. But last year's Delaware corporate law narrowed the internal documents shareholders can demand in fiduciary cases to formal board materials, presumptively cutting off things like emails. Appraisal cases still offer a broader route to records through discovery, the stage of a lawsuit where each side can demand the other's internal documents. So the funds run the sequence on purpose: file the appraisal first, gather the records, then bring what they found into the class action. And because the class action's lead plaintiff picks the lawyers, sets the strategy, and can settle for everyone, the final move in the strategy is the one we watched this week, the fight over who holds the pen.

The main takeaway: An announced deal price is an opening position, not a law of nature. Some of the most sophisticated funds in the world make their living in the gap between a headline number and what a judge, or a negotiation, later decides that number should have been.

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From Issue No. 08 · Commodities & Alternatives

Volkswagen Sold Half of Its Wardrobe but Kept the Investment Piece

Fixed IncomeEquitiesForeign ExchangeDerivativesCommodities & Alternatives

Note: this week's article does not cover commodity prices — it focuses on private markets only.

Let's start with what private markets actually means. When you buy a share of Apple or Volkswagen, you are buying on the public market, where anyone with a brokerage account can trade and prices update by the second. Private markets are everything that happens outside of that — buying whole companies, or parts of them, that are not listed on any exchange. It is a world most people never interact with directly, but it moves large sums of money. The Volkswagen and Bain deal is a textbook example of it in action. Let's use this deal to understand what is really going on, step by step.

Step 1: Where the Money Comes From

A private equity firm like Bain invests relatively little of its own money. The bulk it raises from a large pool of outside investors who commit their capital in the hope of a strong return. These outside investors are typically large institutions like pension funds, insurance companies, university endowments, and sovereign wealth funds. They are also known as limited partners, because they put in the capital but leave the decisions to the firm.

That pool is committed but not yet spent, and it has its own name in the industry: dry powder, an old phrase about keeping your gunpowder dry and ready to fire. In finance it means the same thing — money that has been raised and is ready, waiting for the right opportunity. The industry is sitting on near record reserves of dry powder right now, which is a big part of why a firm can move quickly and commit billions to a single deal the moment the right one appears.

Step 2: The Leverage

As covered in the Foundation, when the firm buys a company it does not pay entirely in cash — it borrows most of the price. The reason comes down to simple maths, so let's walk through a quick example. To keep it simple, the interest the loan charges along the way, which in reality eats into the gain, is left out.

Imagine you buy a business for 100. You put in 20 of your own money and borrow the other 80. A few years later you have improved the business and you sell it for 140. You repay the 80 loan, leaving you with 60 in hand. Subtract the 20 you originally put in, and your actual profit is 40. You turned 20 into a 40 profit — a 200% return on your own money, even though the business itself only rose 40% in value.

But the same maths applies if things don't go well. If the business disappoints and you can only sell it for 90, you still repay the 80 loan in full, leaving you with just 10. You lose 10 of your original 20 — a 50% loss on your own money, even though the business only fell 10% in value.

If It Goes Well — Sell for 140

Your cash (equity): 20 · Borrowed (loan): 80

Sale price: 140 · Repay loan: −80 · Cash remaining: 60 · Original investment: −20

Profit: +40 — Your 20 became 60 in hand. A 200% return, even though the business only rose 40%.

If It Goes Wrong — Sell for 90

Your cash (equity): 20 · Borrowed (loan): 80

Sale price: 90 · Repay loan: −80 · Cash remaining: 10 · Original investment: −20

Loss: −10 — Your 20 became 10. A 50% loss, even though the business only fell 10%.

Leverage magnifies both gains and losses. The same force that amplifies your upside amplifies your downside with equal speed. That is why private equity firms cannot afford to simply buy and wait.

Step 3: What the Firm Actually Does Once It Owns the Company

Since the loss can be very large if things go wrong, private equity firms cannot afford to be passive. They get to work making the business more valuable by cutting unnecessary costs, sharpening its focus, and chasing new areas of growth. This is the focused future that Volkswagen's CEO described for Everllence. The plan, from day one, is to improve the company and sell it a few years later for more than was paid. That moment of selling is called the exit, and it is where the firm finally collects its reward.

And this is why the price made sense to Bain. Everllence was valued at €3.4 billion on Volkswagen's own accounts, but Bain is not buying the past. It is buying the data centre and energy growth ahead, and using borrowed money to amplify its reward if that growth arrives. Paying well above book value looks like overpaying if you only focus on the accounting. But it looks like a calculated bet on the future if you believe the investment piece is going to appreciate, and Bain clearly believes exactly that.

The main takeaway: Private markets are where some of the boldest, best resourced investors in the world place their bets. They raise dry powder, borrow heavily to amplify returns, actively improve the businesses they buy, and aim for a profitable exit. This week that whole process is on full display. The fact that a deal this size is getting done with expensive debt, in a cautious market, tells you just how much confidence is sitting in private capital right now.

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